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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a3(2)0).
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

The trial court erred in mling that there were no genuine issues of material

1.

Standard of review: The appellate court reviews the facts and

fact.

inferences in the light most favorable to the nomnoving party, according no deference to
the trial court, and reviews the trial court's mling for coiTectness. Diamond v. Tooele
County, 2004 Ut. App. 135, ^13, 91 P.3d 841.
2.

Citation to the record: This issue was raised and preserved in the trial

court at R. 465-475.
B.

The trial court erred in mling that the Defendants were entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.
1.

Standard of review: Summary judgment is only available when there

are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
2,

Citation to the record: This issue was raised and preserved in the trial

court at P.. 465-475.

1

C.

The trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs motion under Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(f).
1.

Standard of review: The appellate court reviews a denial of a rule 56(f)

motion for an abuse of discretion. Energy Management Sendees v. Shaw, 2005 UT App
9048.
2.

Citation to the record: This issue was raised and preserved in the trial

court at R. 475-477.
D.

The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudicel.

Standard of review: In reviewing a dismissal granted against plaintiff, he is
entitled to have the appellate court review all of the evidence, together with every logical
inference which may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to him. Martin
v. Stevens. 121 Utah 484, 487, 243 P.3d 747 (Utah 1952).
2.

Citation to the record: R. 523-524, 525-526. These were the trial court's

Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Rule
56(f) Motion, and Judgment respectively. Plainiffs'/Appellants' preservation of and
arguments and evidence regarding this issue is contained in their pleadings and affidavits
comprising R. 449-496.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES. RULES
AND REGULATIONS
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment

2

(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT,
and STATEMENT OF FACTS

Brigham Agler and Jayme Olson, Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereafter "Agler and
Olson"), were employed by Kevin Scheidle and Meshwerks, Inc, Defendants/Appellees
(hereafter "Scheidle"). R. 33, 399. After Agler and Olson ended their employment with
Meshwerks August 29, 2003, Mr. Scheidle reported to police that the Agler and Olson
had stolen proprietary material from Meshwerks. R. 34,38, 352.
3

Criminal cases against Agler and Olson were filed on December 5, 2003. R. 38,
352, 468. See also, State of Utah v. Jayme Bryce Olson, Case No. 031102769, and State
of Utah v. Brigham Lee Agler, Case No. 031102765. The criminal cases were dismissed
by the prosecution on March 11, 2005. R. 468, and State of Utah v. Jayme Bryce Olson,
Case No. 031102769, and State of Utah v. Brigham Lee Agler, Case No. 031102765.]
Thereafter, Agler and Olson filed suit against Scheidle on May 31, 2005, alleging
malicious prosecution and abuse of process. R. 1-7. On November 16, 2005, Scheidle
filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 30-448. Agler and Olson filed a Rule 56(f)
Motion and a Memorandum in Opposistion to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Rule 56(f) Motion on December 16, 2005. R. 449-496.
Scheidle filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on January 6, 2006. R. 497-506. Oral argument on the motions was held on
March 6, 2006, and on March 14, 200., R. 522. The trial court granted Scheidle's
summary judgment motion, denied Agler's and Olson's Rule 56(f), entered judgment in
favor of the Defendants/Appellees and dismissed the Agler's/Olson's complaint with
prejudice. R. 523-524, 525-526. Agler and Olson timely filed this appeal. R.. 527-528.

Although not part of the record on appeal, the parties do not and cannot dispute
the dates the criminal cases were filed or eventually dismissed.
4

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Before Alger and Olson had been given a chance to depose Mr. Scheidle and
conduct other discovery, Scheidle moved the Court for summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, claiming that Agler and Olson could
not establish malice or probable cause in support of said claims. Scheidle filed his motion
for summary judgment on November 16, 2005. The parties case management order
established a discoveiy cut-off date of January 31, 2006. R. 18. It was premature for the
trial court to enter summary judgment given the timely nature of the filing of the Rule
56(f) motion, which identified discovery that could defeat summary judgment in light of a
liberal construction of Agler's and Olson's complaint. Further, Scheildle's motion raised
issues that had not yet been discovered, but which Agler and Olson sought to discover
pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in order to properly address
Defendants' motion. Moreover, Scheidle did not oppose Agler's and Olson's Rule 56(f)
motion. R. 520.
Two of the main issues of Agler"s and Olson's complaint, malice and probable
cause, were and are inherently factual issues inappropriate for summary judgment.
Additionally, based on their affidavits, disputed issues of fact existed regarding these two
issues.

5

VI. ARGUMENT
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE IF THERE IS ANY
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary judgment
unless the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and [2] that the moving part)/ is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." U.R.C.P.
56(c). When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is
not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide which side has the stronger case. Rather, the
court's "sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City v.
Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
The nomnoving party is not required to "prove" its case in order to defeat a
summary judgment motion. Rather, the nomnoving party is only required to submit
evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.,
854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993). In addition, "If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party
[and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Finally, the nomnoving party's
evidence is to be believed for purposes of the motion, and if there is a conflict in the
evidence as to a material fact, the motion must be denied. See e.g. Draper City, 888 P.2d
6

at 1100-01.
Scheidle's summary judgment motion failed this standard because disputed issues
of fact exist regarding Agler's and Olson's claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process. Agler
1.

Disputed Issues of Fact Exist Regarding Appellant's Malicious Prosecution
Claim.

Scheidle moved the Court for summary judgment on Agler's and Olson's
malicious prosecution claim. In America Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d
950, 959 (Utah App. 1989), this court held:
In order to successfully maintain a claim for malicious prosecution, a party must
establish four elements: (1) A criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the
defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the
accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) malice, or a
primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.

(Citation omitted). See also, Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Company, 745 P.2d 838,
843 (Utah App. 1987) (same).
The Model Utah Jury Instructions ("MUJI") mirror the four requirements of a
malicious prosecution claim set forth in Schettler:
A plaintiff who has suffered harm as a proximate result of malicious prosecution
by a defendant is entitled to recover compensation from the defendant.
The plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish all of the following elements in a
claim of malicious prosecution:
1. A criminal proceeding was instituted or continued by the defendant against the
plaintiff; and
2. That proceeding was terminated in favor of the plaintiff; and
7

3. Probable cause for the proceeding did not exist; and
4. The proceeding was commenced or continued by the defendant because of
'malice' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.
MUJI 10.19.
As set forth below, issues of fact existed regarding some of these elements, thereby
defeating Scheidle "s summary judgment motion.
a.

Disputed issues of fact surround the inherently factual issue of probable
cause, thereby making this element inappropriate to determine on summary
judgment.
"Probable cause" has been defined as the "facts and circumstances . . . that

are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in
the circumstances shown, that the subject has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense." State v. Trane, 57 P.3d 1052, 1060 (Utah 2002) (citation omitted).
In this matter, disputed facts existed regarding whether Scheidle lacked probable cause in
instituting the criminal action of theft against Agler and Olson.
First, Scheidle knew that Agler and Olson continually and routinely took files,
preferences, tools, models, etc., home with them so that they could work on Meshwerks'
projects outside the office. In fact, Scheidle was thrilled when Agler worked at home
because such meant more money for the company. Scheidle even loaded Meshwerks'
tools on Olson's home computer. R. 459,484-486,491-494.
Second, Scheidle's own conduct in maintaining files on his own personal computer
which he had created at his previous place of employment implied that such conduct was
8

acceptable to him. R. 485,492.
Third, knowing that Agler and Olson had taken many Meshwerks files home with
them, and even approved of Agler taking his preferences and models from Meshwerks the
day he left, Scheidle never expressed disapproval of such practice, or instructed them to
return said items until after they had left Meshwerks. R. 460-461, 464, 485-486, 489,
491-494.
Fourth, Scheidle understood that neither he nor his company owned the models in
question, and that the scripts and preferences were not proprietary. R. 471, 485-488,
492-495. Further, the scripts in question were not even finished when Agler and Olson
left Meshwerks. R.471, 486-487,492,494.
Fifth, after being accused of theft, Olson called Scheidle to find out what was
happening. Instead of taking Olson's phone call or returning Olson's voicemail, Scheidle
instead went straight to the police without first finding out what Olson's story was about
the alleged theft. R. 486.
Agler and Olson asserted that there was implied consent to copy preferences and
models and work on them at home. R. 485-486, 492-494, 502.

Scheidle implicitly

conceded that Agler and Olson had permission to copy preferences and models and to
work on them at home. R. 500.
Apparently, Scheidle agrees that Agler and Olson were allowed to copy models
and take them home to work on them. The "personal purposes" for which Agler copied
9

the models on the eve of his departure were for portfolio purposes, and were his own
creations. R. 493, U 12. Moreover, neither Agler nor Olson believed the models or tools
at issue in this case to be proprietary.

R. 453 (Agler's and Olson's admission that

Meshwerks believes that its 3D models were proprietary, but disagreeing with
Meshwerks5 belief), 488, 495.
There is no support for Scheidle's assertion that the information and material taken
by Agler and Olson when they left Meshwerks was proprietary. The record on appeal is
devoid of any evidence of policies, procedures, guidelines, or writings of any kind
advising employees that such information (models, scripts, preferences, files, etc.) was
proprietary, to be safeguarded, kept confidential, or belonged exclusively to Meshwerks.
No non-disclosure agreements exist. No non-compete agreements exist. Nothing exists
designating such information and/or material as trade secret or proprietaiy property.
The dismissal of the criminal case may well support that there was a significant
factual dispute regarding whether the information was proprietaiy and/or whether Agler
and Olson reasonably believed that they had permission to copy and take it. These facts
and issues were clearly disputed by the parties and went to the issue of whether probable
cause existed for the report made by Scheidle which resulted in criminal action against
Agler and Olson. Thus, it was incorrect, and reversible error, for the trial court to
conclude that there were no genuine issues of disputed fact.

10

2.

Issues of Fact Existed Regarding Malice.
Regarding the malice element in a malicious prosecution action, the Utah

Supreme Court has held, "In proving malice in civil action it is not necessary to prove
actual spite, ill will, or grudge, but it is only necessary to prove wrongful or improper
motive."

Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enterprises. Inc.. 460 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1969)

(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court further held:
To sustain a charge of malicious prosecution, proof of evil motive, hatred, spite or
ill will is not necessarily required, although because of difficulty of overt proof of
such matters, evil motive may be implied from the wrongful act of filing a criminal
complaint without reasonable justification for doing so.
Potter v. Utah Drive-Ur-Self System. Inc. 355 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1960).

Also,

"[m]alice may be implied or inferred from want of probable cause.5' Quermbeck v.
Hanson. 75 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1938).
In the present action, issues of fact existed regarding whether Scheidle had a
"wrongful or improper motive" in instituting the police report that led to criminal action
against Agler and Olson.

Scheidle knew that he had consented to Agler and Olson

copying and taking models, scripts, preferences, files, etc. home with them. Scheidle
knew that the loss of Agler and Olson would be a serious blow to his company's
revenues. R. 472, 489. Agler and Olson were highly regarded in the industry, and Olson
in particular had a highly-recognizable presence in the very small 3D modeling industry.
R. 489. Olson was well known, and brought with him to Meshwerks (and later took with
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him from Meshwerks) a pool of clients and work. R. 489. Many of Meshwerks5 clients
only wanted Olson to do their work. Further, the work Olson brought with him to
Meshwerks, and the hours Plaintiffs worked for Meshwerks generated significant
revenues for Defendants. R. 485, 489. Scheidle knew that when Agler and Olson left
Meshwerks, they could become his competitors. R. 489. Losing Olson caused a serious
drought in leadership and management at Meshwerks because Olson was in charge of
nearly all of Meshwerks' projects. R. 489.
These issues create a legitimate factual dispute as to whether Scheidle had malice
toward Agler and Olson in reporting to the police that they had stolen proprietary
information from his company. Further, as discussed above, Scheidle understood that the
information was not proprietary, and that Agler and Olson reasonably believed they had
his consent to copy and take the information.
Scheidle has not asserted, and there is no evidence of, the existence of a noncompete agreement between Meshwerks and Agler and Olson. Their creation their own
company and taking a substantial number of clients/customers with them after they left
Meshwerks would likely diminish Meshwerks income, giving rise to the potential of
malice by Scheidle.
Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to rule that no genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding the malice issue.

12

3.

Disputed Issues of Fact Exist Regarding Agler5 s and Olson's Abuse of
Process Claim.

In addition to their malicious prosecution claim, Agler and Olson also sued for
abuse of process, which has a different set of prima facie requirements (than an abuse of
process claim). R. 4. The Utah Supreme Court recently defined the two requirements for
this claim:
to establish a claim for abuse of process, a claimant must demonstrate '[fjirst, an
ulterior purpose; [and] second, an act in the use of the process not proper in the
regular prosecution of the proceedings.'
Anderson Development Company, L.C. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005) (citing
Hatch v. Davis. 2004 UT App 378, % 34). In America Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App. 1989), the court held that "the essence of the action is a
perversion of the process to accomplish some improper purpose . . ." (Citation omitted).
The Schettler court further held, "A plaintiff in an abuse of process claim is not required
1o establish that the prior proceeding lacked probable cause.55 IdL
In the present case, disputed issues of fact exist regarding these two elements.
a.

Disputed facts exist regarding Scheidle5 s ulterior motive or purpose.

As stated above, Agler's and Olson's departure from Meshwerks cost Scheidle
significant revenues, and the prospect of Agler and Olson working in the same field as
Meshwerks farther undemiined Meshwerks5 prognosis for increased revenues. Also,
Scheidle cries foul for Agler and Olson taking files, programs, models, etc., when they
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left Meshwerks, the exact same thing he did when he left his previous employer. He also
knew that all of Meshwerks' employees brought home various files, scripts, preferences,
models, tools, etc., which he never demanded back from Agler and Olson at the time they
left Meshwerks. These facts suggest that Scheidle may have had an ulterior motive or
purpose for reporting to the police that Agler and Olson committed theft, and, at least
created an disputed issue of fact that should have defeated summary judgment.
b.

Disputed facts exist regarding whether Scheidle's use of process was proper
in the regular prosecution of the proceedings.

As stated above, Scheidle5s conduct in using process (i.e. reporting Agler and
Olson to the police) is inconsistent with what he allowed at Meshwerks - i.e., he
permitted and consented to Agler and Olson and others to copy models, files, scripts,
preferences, etc., and take them home to continue their work. Scheidle himself kept
copies of models at Meshwerks that he made at his previous work. He was faced with
significantly reduced revenues and the loss of Meshwerks5 top 3D modelers. These facts,
as well as the others set forth above, create a disputed issue of fact regarding whether
Scheidle abused legal process by making a police report that he knew was not true.
It was error for the trial court to rule that no genuine issue of material fact existed
regarding this issue.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
OLSON'S RULE 56(f) MOTION.

Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
14

AGLER'S AND

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
The record on appeal demonstrates that further discovery was needed to ascertain
facts and evidence to properly respond to Scheidle's summary judgment motion: 1)
Scheidle's understanding as to the copying and use by employees of Meshwerks' files,
scripts, tools, models, etc. outside the office; 2) Scheidle's use at Meshwerks of files,
models, scripts, etc., that he created or obtained from his previous place of employment;
3) The financial impact on Meshwerks and Scheidle from the loss of Olson and Agler; 4)
certain witnesses' comments to Agler and Olson about Scheidle filing the criminal
charges as a strategy; 5) Scheidle's understanding as to the use and value of the scripts at
the time Agler and Olson left their employment at Meshwerks, as well as how far the
scripts were from being completed; 6) Scheidle's various litigations and his method for
financing such litigations, as well as the facts and circumstances surrounding his use of
monies from his family trust fund; and 7) the various inconsistencies between Scheidle's
police report and subsequent testimony in this case made under oath, as related to malice,
probable cause, and the reasons for his reporting Agler and Olson to the police. R. 481483.
Without this requested discovery, Agler and Olson were unable to establish their
claims and defenses to Scheidle's summary judgment motion. Moreover, Scheidle never
15

opposed Agler and Olson's Rule 56(f) motion.
"Rule 56(f) motions opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that
discovery has not been completed should be granted liberally unless they are deemed
dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop., Inc., 2002
UT39,lf24,48P.3d910.
The Rule 56(f) motion below was not dilatory or lacking in merit. The parties
established the discovery cut-off date at January 31, 2006 - two and one-half months after
the filing of Scheidle's motion for summaiy judgment.

The case was not even six

months old at the time of filing the motion. It cannot be credibly argued that Agler and
Olson were dilatory in asking the trial court for additional time to conduct discovery to
respond to Scheidle's summary judgment motion.
"A rale 56(f) motion has merit when it targets core issues that might defeat the
pending summary judgment motion." Id.

In the affidavit supporting the Rule 56(f)

motion, issues regarding implied if not clear consent to copy models, files, scripts, tools,
etc., whether or not any material or information was proprietary, and malice in filing the
police report, were identified. Evidence on these issues were germane and relevant to the
issues raised and argued in Scheidle's summary judgment motion and could have
established the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to deny Agler and Olson's Rule 56(f)
motion.
16

VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellants Agler and Olson respectfully request this Court
to reverse the trial court's Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion, and the subsequent Judgment dismissing the
Appellants' complaint with prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /*0-

day of July, 2006.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC

Stephen E. Quesenberry
J. Bryan Quesenberry
D. Scott Davis
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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VIII. ADDENDUM
Exhibit A

Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion

Exhibit B

Judgment
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellants on this [H* day of July, 2006, to the following:

Jerome Romero
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Sent via:
Hand-Delivery
facsimile
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Third Judici.

Jerome Romero (USB #5139)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIGHAM AGLER and JAYME OLSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 56(f) MOTION

KEVIN SCHEJDLE and MESHWERKS, INC,
Civil No. 050909970
Defendants
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
On Monday, March 6, 2006, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as
plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 56(f) relief came on foi hearing. Defendants were represented by
their counsel Jerome Romero, of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough. Plaintiffs were
represented by their counsel, J. Bryan Quesenberry of Hill Johnson & Schmutz. The Court,
having reviewed the Motion, Memoranda, the Affidavit of Kevin Scheidle, deposition
transcripts, as well as the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs, and having heard argument of
counsel, and for the reasons set forth on the record,findsthat defendants are entitled to summary
judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Court

further finds that plaintiffs have not set forth sufficient basis to support the granting of relief
pursuant to Rule 56(f).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for Rule 56(f) relief is denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted,
and this action shall be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this _^_+_ day of March, 2006.

ji
^Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
Third District Court Judge

Approved as to form:
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC
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Jerome Romero (USB #5139)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRIGHAM AGLER and JAYME OLSON,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 050909970

KEVIN SCHEJDLE and MESHWERKS, INC,

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.
The Court, having granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs' Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of March, 2006.

.'

-A

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
Third District Court Judge

\ifh<?

Approved as to form:
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC

